All weapons would have been serviced through an internal weapons bay, helping to keep the aircraft's external surfaces as minimal as possible. The internal bay held a collective maximum threshold of 5,100lbs concerning ordnance or equipment depending on mission type. A typical ground attack configuration would have seen the A-12 fielded with precision-guided drop bombs or these replaced by conventional drop bombs. Beyond its ground attack facilities, the A-12 was also designed to engage aerial targets with applicable munitions. For air-to-air combat, the A-12 would have fielded the AIM-120 AMRAAM medium-ranged air-to-air missile and, most likely, the then-current version of the AIM-9 Sidewinder short-ranged air-to-air missile. Its mission scope could also have been branched out to include reconnaissance and electronic warfare roles should the aircraft had come to term. For the radar suppression role, the A-12 would have been cleared to use the AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation air-to-surface missile.
Dimensionally, the A-12 exhibited a wingspan of 70 feet. This was dramatically reduced when the wings were folded for carrier storage to just 36 feet. The fuselage had a running length of 37 feet, 10 inches with an overall height of 11 feet when the aircraft was at rest. The A-12 would have measured nearly half the length of the F-14 or the A-6 in a carrier hangar. Empty weight was listed at approximately 40,000lbs with a maximum take-off weight nearing 80,000lbs. Power would have been supplied by a pair of General Electric F412-GE-D5F2 engines buried deep within the fuselage. These were non-afterburning turbofan engines (to help reduce heat signatures at the cost of speed) and outputted at 13,000lbs of thrust each. Top speed was estimated at around 580 miles per hour with an operational range of 920 miles, a service ceiling nearing 40,000 feet and rate-of-climb of 5,000 feet per minute.
McDonnell Douglas marketing material sold the Avenger II as an aircraft featuring all of the qualities required for the ever-evolving USN mission of the time. Its low-observable nature would have allowed it to break through the enemy air defense network without revealing its presence to active ground stations - inherently increasing mission survivability rates for the pilots - until the absolutely last possible second, which left little time for the enemy to react. The aircraft's internal payload capacity, coupled with sophisticated onboard systems, would have allowed for use of precision-guided weaponry to meet the new demands of the American air campaigns to follow. As a flying wing design, internal fuel stores would have given the A-12 excellent ranges without requiring refueling when compared to the then-existing options available to the USN. Of course marketing material also touted the aircraft's quick turn-around time and low long-term support costs - staple qualities of any aircraft "in development" and not proven in-the-field.
McDonnell Douglas expected the aircraft to be ready by mid-1990. While primary interest in the A-12 was held by the USN, it was only natural that the USMC would see a need to upgrade their stable of aircraft in turn. Additionally, the USAF entertained the notion of procuring the A-12 as well, to a certain extent, and this would have been a slightly revised land-based version of the naval design. The USN contemplated purchasing some 620 examples with the USMC receiving a further 238 all their own. USAF interest was such that 400 aircraft were slated to be procured.
However, all for the A-12 program began to unravel by 1990. Delays, inevitable cost overruns and design issues began to plague the project before even a single aircraft had been built. The aircraft was now proving to be much heavier than originally anticipated and problems with the advanced systems soon arose - particularly with the aperture radar and avionics intended to be installed. The composite structure was proving a nuisance of sorts and forced the use of metals instead, bloating the overall weight in the process - the A-12 was now some 30% over the required operating weight. The projected costs of continued development led to a natural "tightening of the noose" around the stealth project. While the original first flight was intended for late 1990, the revised schedule showcased a later date sometime in 1992.
Regardless of the efforts being made to keep the A-12 program viable, the US Secretary of Defense - then one Richard "Dick" Cheney - was not convinced of the projects long-term investment. With no aircraft to show for the millions of tax payer dollars already poured into the program and no concrete dates being delivered by the contractors, Cheney used his authoritative powers to cancel the A-12 Avenger II outright on January 7th, 1991. The story of the A-12 did not end there for, in the years following, there have been countless litigation efforts from both the federal government and the contractors involved to recoup lost project costs - litigation that has yet to be settled in American courts to this very day (now 2012, some 20+ years since the project's start). The loss of the A-12 went on to have several ripple effects in the US defense world - the A-6 was still retired though not until 1997 and replaced by the F/A-18 Super Hornet while McDonnell Douglas' financial sufferings forced it to team with powerhouse Boeing for its sheer survival (MD is now a subsidiary of the Boeing brand).
It is believed that only one full-size mockup of the A-12 was ever completed. Recent reports have also showcased the canopy section believed to be of the A-12 appearing on eBay, its origin being somewhat cloudy but the product believed to be authentic nonetheless (based on available serial numbers found on the parts). At the point of its cancellation, the A-12 program was the largest and costliest cancellation undertaken by the US DoD.
Update February 2014: It was revealed that the United States Navy had ended its long-running agruement with General Dynamics and Boeing over the settlement of the A-12 project. The U.S. government has elected to take a $400 million dollar settlement to end the decades of legal wrangling between all parties.
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